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Abstract
Term rewriting – an expressive language based on equational logic – can be used
to author and analyze policies that are part of an access control system. Maude [25]
is a simple, yet powerful, reflective programming language based on term rewriting
that models systems along with the subjects, objects and actions within them.
We specify the behavior of the system as a theory defined by conditional rewrite
rules, and define the access control policy as an equational theory in a separate
module. The tools that Maude provides, such as the Maude Model Checker and
the Sufficient Completeness Checker, are used to reason about the behavior and
verify properties of access control systems in an automated manner.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
In modern systems authorization mechanisms have moved beyond the classical
access control matrix [24] and access control decisions are represented by sets of
rules comprising an access control policy. In this setting we want to be able to
reason about the policy. Some of the relevant questions that will be addressed are:
• is the policy consistent, i. e., is it impossible to compute different decisions
for the same access control request?
• is the policy complete, i. e., is there a decision specified for all requests?
• does the policy allow certain actions, i. e., is there an accessible state satis-
fying some Boolean expression over policy facts?
In order to achieve this goal we will use formal approaches to create a model of
the system: the existence of a model gives us the ability to apply formal proofs
and techniques to verify these security properties. We will explore the use of term
rewriting [2] as a language for access control and use the environment of the term
rewriting system Maude [25] to represent the system comprising the program and
the policy, and to verify policy properties using Maude’s model checking tool.
1.1 Dynamic Access Model
One of the most important problems in access control is the the problem of
formalization of expressive access control models. The availability of such models
facilitates the authoring of security policies and their verification according to a
set of properties. Thus, in order to verify the correctness of a policy, it is useful
to examine it as a separate module which, coupled with the environment, defines
a dynamic access model [16]. The separation of the policy from the program is
desirable since it promotes reusability, facilitates policy maintenance and provides
a module that is verifiable with automated systems.
1
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Figure 1: Dynamic Access Model
An important aspect of this interaction is the fact that the generated decisions
are not based solely on the information contained in the incoming request or the
policy but also on external factors in the environment. The set of facts relevant to
the policy obtained from the program, the end-users, or the policy framework can
be modeled as a transition system [8] (see figure 1). Transitions in the policy’s
environment are prompted by either user/application actions or other events. In
general, the environment models will be interpretations partially derived from the
application.
As an example, consider the policy from Figure 2 governing student access
to assignments and grades: a student is required to submit an assignment and a
grader has to assign a grade before the user is allowed to view the grade.
1. A student may read only his own grade for an assignment
2. A student cannot grade any assignments
3. A TA may read & grade any assignments
4. A student can submit an assignment if the assignment is open
Figure 2: Candidate policy V for controlling access to student records
The application maintains the information about submitted assignments by
students, such as whether the assignment is still open, etc; the policy reference
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monitor consults the information when a request comes along before issuing an
access decision. This information forms the environment of the policy, which can
be represented also as a list of atomic sentences. A request from a student to
submit an assignment does not include information about whether the assignment
is still open: that fact might have changed due to an administrator being granted a
request to close the assignment. The environment data can be affected by external
factors, while the policy remains static.
1.2 Term Rewriting
Term rewriting [2] offers a solution to representing the transition blueprint of
the program along with the access control policy. It is a well-established paradigm
whose applications include theoretical foundations for functional programming
languages and theorem provers. A fairly simple computational standard built on
the repeated application of rules, term rewriting is organized around the concepts
of signature, terms, substitution and matching. It is a process that starts with a
set of rewrite rules and an initial term (built from variables, constants and function
symbols), which is reduced to a term that might be in its normal form, i. e. further
irreducible term. Matching – linear on the size of the term – occurs when two
given terms, are equal after applying a subset of the rules. The distinction between
equational logic and term rewriting is the fact that equations are used as directed
replacement rules: the arrow in the example group theory axioms below suggest
one-directional term replacement:
(1) x ◦ e→ x
(2) i(x) ◦ e→ e
(3) (x ◦ y) ◦ z → x ◦ (y ◦ z)
Figure 3: Group Theory Axioms as Rewrite Rules
Rewriting with conditional identities, also know as conditional rewriting, is an
expanded form of the above concept, where a term on the left side will be rewritten
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only if a specific condition applies. For example, a stack pop rule can be expressed
as the conditional term rewriting rule
push(pop(s))→ s if s 6=nil
where nil is a predefined constant corresponding to the empty stack.
1.3 Term Rewriting for Access Control
The expressive nature of term rewriting is an important reason for applying
rewrite techniques to access control, policy specification and access request check-
ing. A rule from our policy from Figure 2 could be written, based on [13], as:
auth(student(x), checkGrade , assignment(x, g, a)) → permit
stating that a student (identified by his/hers unique ID) may check grades for
any assignment that is authored by him or her. Here, the function student maps
student ID to students as an element of the Subjects set and assignment maps
student ID, grade and assignment ID to assignments as an element of the Objects
set, while checkGrade is a constant symbol of sort Actions. The variable x is im-
plicitly universally quantified, so that the rewriting above captures the generality
of the access rule; the repetition of the variable as a parameter has the effect of
enforcing the binding between the student and his/her assignment. In this man-
ner the policy is transposed into rewrite rules and additional conditions can be
imposed to capture subtle points. We distinguish ourselves from such approaches
for they do not entirely match our dynamic access model based on the distinction
between program, policy and system.
1.4 Maude
Maude [9] is a high-level language and a high-performance system supporting
executable specification and both equational and rewriting logic computation [10].
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Because of these features Maude is suitable for modeling nondeterministic concur-
rent computations. Its main modules are functional and system, corresponding
respectively to the logics it supports. It must be noted that Maude also contains
OBJ [20] as a sublanguage representing object-oriented computation enclosed in
object-oriented modules. We are focusing on exploring Maude’s environment in
relation to formalization of security polices in a way that is easy to comprehend
and replicate for a wide range of applications.
1.4.1 Functional Modules
Functional modules are equational-style functional programs with user-definable
syntax in which a number of sorts, their elements, and functions on those sorts are
defined [9]. They are theories in membership equational logic [7] extending order-
sorted equational logic [19], support subsort relations, and overloading of operators.
Functional modules are assumed to be Church-Rosser [2] and terminating (pg. 16)
– if equations are applied repeatedly then eventually an irreducible term will be
computed (pg. 15). Using these types of modules we define our policy signature
and authorization mechanism.
1.4.2 System Modules
A level higher, system modules are theories in rewrite logic having three types
of statements: equations, memberships and rules, all of which can be conditional
[9]. The rules, contrary to equations in a functional modules, do not have to
be Church-Rosser or terminating. A TRS will specify concurrent transitions in
our system comprising of the policy and the program. More specifically, a set of
conditional rules will define the transitions in our system - the system will proceed
depending on decisions computed by the authorization mechanism.
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1.4.3 Tools
Because we specify security policies using rewrite logic we can employ formal
methods to reason about certain properties. We can use Maude’s built-in search
capabilities to reason about the performance of the system. A rewrite theory is
most of the times nondeterministic: to analyze all possible behaviors from a given
initial state, one can use Maude’s high performance search capabilities and/or
Maude’s built-in Model Checker. The Model Checker provides fully automated
decidable program verification of finite-state systems. In addition to the Model
Checker, Maude comes with a Termination Tool used to prove termination of
functional modules, which is an important property for access control policies.
Another useful feature is the Sufficient Completeness Checker (SCC) that verifies
the property whether every operation in a specification is defined on all valid
inputs, which is important for policy composition.
1.4.4 Example
Following is a sample approach for defining the policy V from Figure 2 using
Maude. Regardless of the programming technique for implementing the authoriza-
tion mechanism, it is essential that we indicate the main sorts, such as Subject,
Action and Object, and their subsorts. We also need to define the available ac-
tions. The order-sorted nature of the terms avoids common mistakes, because
type-checking is performed on the specifications.
6
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fmod SIGNATURES-SORTS is
protecting STRING .
protecting NAT.
---general sorts
sorts Subject Object Action SysAction SubjAction Fact Facts
Decision Node .
subsort SysAction SubjAction < Action .
subsort Fact < Facts .
---policy domain specific sorts
sorts Student Grader Assgmt Grade .
subsorts Student Grader < Subject .
subsorts Assgmt Grade < Object .
---constructs
op student : Nat −→ Student [ctor] .
op as : Nat Grade Student −→ Assgmt [ctor] .
---respectively, assgnmt number, grade, and student who submitted
the assgmt
op grade : Nat −→ Grade [ctor] .
---actions
op checkGrade : Ass −→ SubjAction .
op closeAssgmt : Nat −→ SysAction .
...
endfm
Figure 4: Sorts Partitioning in Maude
In the signature for the rewriting-based access control policies we can represent
requests ground terms containing the 3-tuple: subject, action and object ; permit
and deny serve as decision replies. A policy module in Maude can be viewed as a
static module containing a set of conditional equations that evaluate the facts in
the environment (a multiset of atomic sentences) upon a request:
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fmod SIGNATURES-POLICY is
protecting SIGNATURE-SORTS .
---variables
vars N G S S1 : Nat .
---decisions
op permit deny : −→ Decision [ctor] .
---authorization construct
op auth : Facts Action Subject −→ Decision .
---access rules defining the auth function
eq auth(F, checkGrade(as(N,G,student(S))), student(S1)) = if S ==
S1 then permit
else deny fi .
(corresponds to rule 1. A student may read only his own grade for
an assignment)
...
endfm
Figure 5: Policy Signature in Maude
Modules such as the one in Figure 5 could be created for any real world policy
regardless of the structure or hierarchy it possesses. We expand and apply these
initial steps to analyze an Assignment Submission Application, to encode the
specifications following the above ideas, and to check for properties that are not
explicit policy rules using the Model Checker tool.
1.5 Rewriting-Based Approaches
In the short example above we observed that a policy written in natural lan-
guage can be transformed into a sentence in a rule-based language such as term
rewriting. There are other existing approaches employing similar techniques using
Datalog [16], first order logic [21], or temporal logic [12]. In the following two
sections we refer to a rewrite formalization of a medical corporation policy based
on an XACML [26] specification and to a formalism of Role-Based Access Control
(RBAC) using the same paradigm. We distinguish ourselves from the approach for
RBAC using term rewriting by Barker and Fernandez [3] but we are influenced
by the work of de Oliveira [13] on his Maude implementation concept.
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1.5.1 Fernandez
In [3] the authors explore how to represent access control models and policies
using term rewriting systems; in particular representing role-based models and
models based on access control lists. The rewrite system RACL for the former
constitutes rewrite rules of the type acl(1, r, U) → grant, where a request is
expressed as access(u, req) – with u denoting a user and req denoting an r (read),
w (write) or x (execute) action – is evaluated using the list of rules. In contrast to
this model, we use term rewriting to specify a complete system with the program
separate from the policy specification. While Fernandez et al. mention the idea
of using Maude as the specification environment, we go further by providing an
approach to translating Datalog specifications into Maude modules along with a
set of a Maude implementation of Turnin (pg. 44).
1.5.2 Oliveira
In [13], Oliveira proposes a formalization of rewriting-based access control poli-
cies with the policy being represented as a set of rewrite rules as opposed to
equational theory axioms (pg. 26). He presents an implementation of a medical
corporation policy using Maude modules. Requests are represented as ground
terms containing the 3-tuple: subject, action and object:
req : Subject × Action × Object → Request
and the system is represented by a set of states and state transitions triggered
by the requests. We have adopted the use of a reference monitor as a part of
the system, which evaluates the system states but we make the clean distinction
between a system and a program. We also attempt to model a behavior of a
system comprising of a policy and a program rather than analyzing a policy rule
and a program state as part of the same algebraic term.
9
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1.6 Contributions
This thesis builds on existing work in the area of formalization of access control
policies using term rewriting. We adopt the ideas and base our implementation
partially on the work of Dougherty et al. [16]. Because of the availability of proof
techniques for verifying properties and the availability of rewrite engines, term
rewriting was chosen as the language for this project. The main contribution lies
in the fact that we provide an implementation of the theories using Maude and
take advantage of its built in tools to verify certain properties. We test our ap-
proach on Turnin [17], an Assignment Submission Application, using the available
specifications [17] and offer an approach to translate Datalog policy specification
to Maude implementation (pg. 30).
It is imperative to stress the realization of the interaction between facts in the
environment and the place of the latter in the request authorization process. We
have exemplified the above as Maude modules (pg. 44) using equational theory
axioms (pg. 25) and conditional rules (pg. 27) – both part of the term rewriting
paradigm. The former express the static nature of the policy and define the au-
thorization function (pg. 25), while the latter simulates the system that embodies
both the policy and the program (pg. 25). In the chapters to follow, we provide
definitions that comprise the basis for our approach to modeling the policy, the
program and the system.
2 Foundation of Rewriting-Based Security Policies
Access control in information systems refers to the mechanism of granting
access to data and available resources to authorized entities. These entities com-
prise agents capable of performing certain computations such as the invocation of
a command or a program, the initiation of a thread of execution, etc. According
to Lampson [24], access by a subject (pg. 11) of an object (pg. 11) in the system
is decided by an access matrix with entries determined by certain rules. The rules
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comprise the access control policy , which maps each entity – user, resource and
action (pg. 11) – to a decision. Upon an action initiated by a user, the reference
monitor consults the policy and issues a decision based on the information from
the request and relevant facts in the environment.
2.1 Terms and Concepts
We have defined below the relevant access control terms that are used through-
out this document.
(Object) The set of all protected entities relevant to the system protection re-
quirements is called the set of objects [6]. Lampson treats entities such as
processes, domains, records, fields, files, segments and terminals as objects
and the level of abstraction depends on the protection requirements of the
system.
(Subject) A subject is an active entity, such as a process or a user. The subject
may initiate a transition from the current state of the system depending on
the information in the request (pg. 11) and the authorization decision (pg.
11).
(Action) An action is the initiation of an operation by a subject. Depending on
the level of abstraction we can differentiate between system actions, initiated
by the system, and subject actions, initiated as requests by subjects.
(Request) A request is a triple consisting of an object being accessed, a user
initiating an action and the action itself.
(Decision) A decision is the result issued by the authorization mechanism, either
deny or permit, upon evaluation of the information provided by the request
and the current state of the environment.
(Environment) The environment is a collection of relevant policy domain facts.
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2.2 Historical Perspective on Access Control
Examples of access control depend on the specific requirements of the domain
and the security policy to be in use. For example, applications that manage per-
sonal records, being financial, health or other, require a sophisticated mechanism
to maintain confidentiality or integrity properties by means of access rules. These
sets of global constraints on the system comprise the access control policy.
Access control policy is just one of the mechanisms to enforce a given security
policy. When an application or user requests to act upon a resource, the decision
tool provides, or restricts, access to the resource based on information in the
security policy. While access control policies can pertain to specific applications,
they can also refer to user actions within the context of a certain domain: they
may govern resource usage based on users’ roles, obligations, permissions, etc.
depending on the properties the security policy aims to satisfy.
Lampson [24] organized the objects that need protection, the subjects that
perform actions on these objects and the actions themselves into a matrix of priv-
ileges regulating the access of subjects to objects. In this framework, a singular
entry in the matrix represented the right a given subject has over an object. Un-
fortunately, he does not specify precisely how the access control matrices should
be used by the defined domains.
The need for a mathematical model of security policy describing levels of ac-
cess led to the formalization of military access control rules by Bell and Lapadula
[5]. The BLP model described the military classification system where user with a
certain authorization level is only allowed to access information labeled at or below
their designated classification level. Having the policy designate the appropriate
labels according to the security levels does not make the information flow trans-
parent upon implementation. The subtleties of the interaction between entities in
the system required a rigorous model that could be analyzed in detail.
Harrison, Ullman and Ruzzo [22] address the issue of protection in a more
technical manner. They gave a mathematical definition of “safety” and address the
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question of reasoning about the safety of a system; in particular, the decidability of
safety. “Autonomous” entities relinquish some of their rights for higher protection
levels – in the modeled system this fact undoubtedly remains. This leads to
the conclusion that in general it is undecidable if “a particular generic right is
entered at some place in the matrix where it did not exist before.” Nevertheless,
if the problem is narrowed down to some restricted cases, then safety is decidable
concerning the “leaking” of certain rights. The remark of Harisson et al. showed
that if the system has little control over the flow of rights between subjects, then
there exists a chain of delegation of rights that will eventually grant access to an
object to an unauthorized user.
All of the above works are considered central to the field of computer security
for they introduced the idea of formalization and verification of security policies.
The need for a mathematical model was recognized and in this setting security
properties could be checked. Because of the limitations of the early models to
describe the current system, a new, rule-based approach for specifying policies
emerged as a flexible solution to a wider scope of systems. The availability of a rule-
based specification language does not make the search for a better representational
model obsolete.
2.3 Languages & Logics for Access Control
Because of the wide range of applications that demand the enforcement of secu-
rity policies, specific languages must be used to express the policy statements. A
number of languages for access control have been proposed. A role-based language
and system for expressing policies, Cassandra [4] supports credential-based access
control written in Datalog with constraints. In this setting, policies are viewed
as declarative statements over data from requests and over relations that capture
information gathered by the application. Domain-specific languages such as EPAL
[27] are also widely used. EPAL specifies data handling enterprise privacy policies;
a policy in EPAL defines lists of data-categories along with sets of actions and is
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used to model the services in the system’s domain.
With the increased number of applications utilizing XML for data modeling,
additional languages have been proposed such as WS-Policy and XACML [26].
The latter is a standard that describes both a policy language and an access-
control decision language written exclusively in XML. The authors of [18] present
a tool (Margrave) for analyzing XACML policies (for ex. RBAC) through a verifier
written in XACML. They discuss two forms of policy analysis, namely, verifica-
tion relative to known properties and change analysis, and present techniques for
performing the analysis in Margrave.
Recently, language designs have been structured around concepts from logic
programming such as Languages such as Li et al.’s D1LP and RT, Jim’s SD3, and
DeTreville’s Binder [15]. Binder [14] utilize the formal declarations, flexibility and
expressiveness providing for an access control language requiring modest program-
ming proficiency. Because of their formal nature, logic based languages provide
an attractive framework for specifying policies and we explore the flexibility and
expressiveness of one such language in this work, namely, term rewriting.
Several proposals introduce term rewriting as a language for describing access
control policies. In [3], the authors model role-base access control (RBAC) and
access control lists (ACLs). They explore the use of term rewriting for evaluating
access requests and for proving properties of an access control policy. Rather
than focusing on the dynamic aspect of the access control environment, they focus
mainly on characterization of consistency of policies. Use of an automated tool to
reason about policy properties is briefly mentioned and an executable specification
of ACL policy is given but implementation is not suggested.
Work in the area of defining security policies using term rewriting can be seen
in Oliveira’s proposal [13] on formalization for access control. He represents the
state of the system to which policies are enforced as an algebraic term and discusses
the relation between properties of TRS, such as confluence and termination.
14
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3 Term Rewriting
The following rewriting definitions are adopted from “Term Rewriting and All
That” [2]. In the term rewriting paradigm, terms (pg. 15) are built from function
symbols and variables thus, in order to know which are the domain symbols, we
introduce signatures.
Definition 1 (Signature). A signature Σ is a set of function symbols, where each
f ∈ Σ is associated with a non-negative integer n denoting the arity of f . This
definition will be extended for our purposes to include the set of sorts S (pg. 23),
thus a many-sorted signature is defined as a set F of function symbols and a set
of sorts S where each f ∈ Σ has a profile f : S1× ...× Sn−→S. If n = 0 then f
is defined as a constant symbol.
Definition 2 (Term). Let X be a set of variables such that Σ
⋂
X = Ø, then
the set T (F,X) of all well-sorted Σ−terms is defined inductively as
• X ⊆ T (F,X), i. e., each x ∈ X is a term with x : S denoting the sort of x
• ∀ n≥ 0, all f ∈ Σ(n)
If t1 is a variable-free term then t1 is called a ground term and the set of such
terms is denoted T (F ). The term t1 is said to be in its normal form or irreducible
if there is no term t2 such that t1−→ t2. Many-sorted terms are built on many
sorted signatures [23].
Definition 3 (Substitution). A substitution σ is a function, σ : X −→ T (F,X),
such that σ(x) 6= x for only finitely many xs. The finite domain of σ is written
as σ = {x1 7→ t1, . . . , xk 7→ tk}, with ∀i∈{1, . . . , k}, xi and ti have the same
sort. Applying σ to t simultaneously replaces all occurrences of variables by the
respective σ-images. Recursively,
• if t is xi then σ(x) = ti,
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• if t is x 6= xi then σ(x) = t,
• if t is a term f(u1, . . . , uk) with u1, . . . , uk ∈ T (F,X) then,
σ(t) = f(σ(u1, . . . . σ(uk)).
Definition 4 (Multiset). A multiset M over a set of elements A is a function
M : A −→ N. Using finite multisets we can build terminating orders (be-
cause −→ is finitely branching). For example, {t1, t2, t2} and {t2, t1, t2} are
identical, while {t1, t2, t1} is distinct from them.
Definition 5 (Rule). A rewrite rule is an identity t1 ≈ t2 denoted t1−→ t2 with
t1 and t2 called respectively left-hand side and right-hand side of the rule. The
following restrictions apply for rules:
• set of variables of t1 ⊇ set of variables of t2
• t1 /∈X and t1, t2 ∈ T (F,X)
• t1 and t2 are of the same sort
A set of rewrite rules is called a term rewriting system (TRS).
Definition 6 (Rewrite Relation). A relation on T (F,X) is a rewrite relation if and
only if it is compatible with Σ-operations and closed under substitutions. Given
a TRS R, the rewrite relation associated to R over T (F,X) is denoted −→R and
is well-defined.
Definition 7 (Termination). A reduction −→ is terminating if and only if, there
does not exist an infinite descending chain t1−→t2−→ . . . .
Definition 8 (Consistency). Consistency is a security policy property that en-
sures that a unique decision is computed from the current program state (pg. 19)
and a given request.
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Definition 9 (Confluence). A set of rules A is confluent when any two rewritings
of a term can always be unified by further rewriting: if t −→ ∗
A
t1 and t −→
∗
A
t2,
then there exists a term t
′
such that t1 −→
∗
A
t
′
and t2 −→
∗
A
t
′
[9].
Definition 10 (Completeness). Completeness is a security policy property that
ensures that for any given request there is a corresponding authorization decision.
We model the program and the policy using equational theory – a sublogic of
term rewring logic – while the system is modeled using conditional rules.
3.1 Equational Theory
Any given equality formulas is built from the set of terms defined above and
the equality predicate “ = ".
Definition 11 (Equality or Axiom). An equality (axiom) is a pair of two terms
< t1, t2 >, which is denoted t1 = t2. Both t1 and t2 are of the same sort, with
the variables universally quantified.
Definition 12 (Matching). Let t1 and t2 are terms of the same sort then, if there
exists a substitution σ such that σ(t1) = t2 then we say that there is a matching
between t1 and t2.
3.2 Conditional Rules
Definition 13 (Conditional Rule). A conditional rule is an oriented condition
equality denoted t−→ s if Γ , where Γ is a conjunction of equalities [23].
Definition 14 (Conditional Rewriting). A conditional TRS R is a set of condi-
tional rules R over a set of terms T (F,X).
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4 Conceptual Model
Our conceptual model describes policy enforcement of security rules guarding
transitions in the program states. The idea is that we would like to preserve poli-
cy/program separation since the program can exist independently of a mechanism
applying a given policy. The latter should be defined separately and implemented
on top of the running program as a reference monitor (pg. 18).
Reference Monitor
auth(F , r, u)
AC Policy
.Ni+ Ni+1
permit
Figure 6: Reference Monitor Model
In the above representational schema the current set of facts and the request
contained in the the nodeNi are delivered to the reference monitor, which evaluates
every request according to the set of equational rules A (pg. 26). If the policy
permits the request the application proceeds with no error indication. Otherwise,
the system terminates.
4.1 The Program
It is clear that a program can exist without a guarding mechanism. Hence, we
model the program as an independent labeled transition system.
Definition 15 (Program LTS). A program P is modeled as a labeled transition
system (LTS). The LTS is a quadruple (V , L, ⇁, I ) where
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• V is a set of vertices with v ∈ V corresponding to a program state
• L is a set of labels with l ∈ L corresponding to an action
• ⇁ ⊆ V × L × V is a ternary relation of labeled transitions
• I ⊆ V is a set of initial states
program LTS
v0 v1
l0 l1
Figure 7: Program LTS
4.2 The Policy
A security policy is a statement of what actions are permitted and what are
denied in a given environment. For that purpose we need to define positive (permit)
and negative (deny) authorizations. These are elements of the set of decisions.
Definition 16 (Decision). We define the set D of decisions depending on the
policy’s requirements as either
• D = {permit, deny}, or
• D = {permit, deny, undefined}.
Definition 17 (Policy). A policy A is a function Θ : V × L −→ D. It generates
a decision d ∈ D for each < V, L > pair.
Policy consistency is inherent in this definition. The interesting question arises
when we encode the policy as a set of equational theory axioms – does the set define
a policy according to the above definition?
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4.3 The System
In our model the rewrite system is the program extended with the policy. A
system state is a node n ∈ V with l ∈ L labeling the transition.
Definition 18 (System). We denote the system T as ordered pair, T ,< P,A >.
4.4 The Logic
We use linear temporal logic (LTL) for property specification and model check-
ing to decide whether – given our model – a property holds. Using LTL we can
specify the safety, liveness or other properties (pg. 1).
Definition 19 (LTL). Let AP be a set of atomic propositions, then the proposi-
tional LTL(AP ) formulas are defined as [9]:
• True: T ∈ LTL(AP ).
• Atomic Propositions: if p ∈ AP , then p ∈ LTL(AP ).
• Next operator: if α ∈ LTL(AP ), then ©α ∈ LTL(AP ).
• Until operator: if α, β ∈ LTL(AP ), then β U α ∈ LTL(AP ).
• Minimal set of Boolean connectives: if α, β ∈ LTL(AP ), then
¬α and α ∨ β ∈ LTL(AP )
Definition 20 (Kripke Structure). A Kripke structure [8] is a 4-tuple
M = (S, I, R, L) consisting of
• a finite set of states S
• a set of initial states I ⊆ S
• a transition relation R ⊆ S×S where ∀s∈S, ∃s
′
∈ S such that (s, s
′
) ∈ R
• a labeling (or “interpretation”) function L : S → 2AP
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The labeling function associates to each s ∈ S the set L(s) ⊆ AP of proposi-
tions that hold at s.
Definition 21 (Satisfaction Relation). A satisfaction relation between M , s and
α is denoted as
M, s  α
and holds if and only if ∀pi ∈ Path(M)s the path satisfaction relation
M, pi  α
where the set Path(M)s of computation paths from s is the set of functions of the
form pi : N −→M s.t. pi(0) = s and pi(n) −→ M pi(n + 1) for each n ∈ N [9].
Associating a Kripke structure – a model of LTL – to a rewrite theory (our
system) is accomplished by defining system states as Kripke structure states (ks-
states) and defining the ks-state predicates.
5 Policy Formalization in Maude
The conceptual model from figure 6 is translated into Maude modules with
each module representing corresponding specification. The Program and the Pol-
icy modules each inherit the Signature module, which contains domain specific sort
definitions and function symbols (see signature on pg. 15). The System module in-
cludes the Program and the Policy, and contains conditional rewrite rules defining
the system. The Kripke module includes the predefined Model Checker module
and specifies the system transformation to a Kripke structure. Batch is the main
executable, which loads the all of the modules and contains sample reductions.
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Signatures
Policy
Program
System Kripke
Batch
Model Checker
Figure 8: Maude Modules Importation Graph
In the above module relationship a single arrow represents an including [25]
importation and a double arrow represents a protecting [25] importation.
5.1 Signatures
For a given access control specification we model the static policy using equa-
tional theory. We will use the following running example to illustrate the imple-
mentation in Maude:
Let us suppose that a school policy for registering students lacks granularity
and its specifics are contained in a few simple rules:
1. A student is permitted to register only if the student has paid
2. A student is denied registration if the student has not paid or the
student paid but the payment has been compromised
3. A student is permitted to pay if the student has not paid already
Figure 9: Register Policy
Formalizing the problem and the system requires the use of order-sorted spec-
ifications. In general, we need to indicate, which sorts are subsorts of Subject,
Action, Object - this list can be modified depending on the requirements. The im-
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plementations of the following definitions will be part of the Maude SIGNATURE
module from Figure 7.
Definition 22 (Sorts). Let S be the set of sorts and subsorts
S =
{
Subject , Action , Object , SysAction , SubjAction, Fact , Facts , Decision, Node, S
′
}
• SysAction and SubjActions subsorts of Action
• S′ denotes additional sorts specific to the environments, i. e., it is possible
for S′ = Ø
• Node denotes the system configuration
---general sorts
sorts Subject Object Action SysAction SubjAction Fact Facts
Decision Node .
subsort SysAction SubjAction < Action .
subsort Fact < Facts .
---specific sorts to the environment
sort Individual .
subsort Individual < Subject .
...
Figure 10: Constructs and Sorts
We define the policy environment as a set of facts. Important notion here is the
fact satisfiability : the environment satisfies a given fact if the fact is an element
of the set of facts in the current state:
Definition 23 (Fact Satisfiability). Let P be the set of environment typical n-
ary predicates with n dependent exclusively on the specifications, and has is the
binary function
has : Facts× P → Boolean
then for F ∈ Facts and p ∈ P the function is defined by the following axioms:
23
5 POLICY FORMALIZATION IN MAUDE
• has(F, p) = True if p ∈ F
• has(F, p) = False otherwise.
---facts specific to the policy domain
ops paid regd bncd : Individual -> Fact .
---fact satisfiability axioms
var F : Facts .
var P : Fact .
op _has_ : Facts Fact -> Bool .
eq F P has P = true .
eq F has P = false [owise] .
...
Figure 11: Facts and Fact Satisfiability
Definition 24 (Multiset of Facts). The set of environment relevant Facts is a
multiset of predicates P ⊆ Facts composed together by a defined associative and
commutative constructor.
---multiset of facts
op nil : -> Facts [ctor] .
op __ : Facts Facts -> Facts [assoc comm id: nil] .
...
Figure 12: Facts
Definition 25 (System Actions). The set SysAction contains actions that are
system specific and do not require authorization (see auth function on pg. 26).
Definition 26 (Subject Actions). The set SubjAction contains actions specific
to the environment and are defined by n-parameter functions with n dependent
on the specifications. Such functions map S
′
⊆ S to the sort SubjAction.
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---requests specific to the domain
op wtr : Individual -> SubjAction . ---subject wants to register
op wtp : Individual -> SubjAction . ---subject wants to pay
op bnc : Individual -> SubjAction . ---subject check bounce
...
Figure 13: Subject Actions
5.2 The Program
We represent the program as a set of equations defining the transition system
of the environment facts as depicted in Figure 1.
Definition 27 (State-update Function). The function nextF is defined as
nextF : Facts×Action × Subject −→ Facts
This function evaluates the current set of environment facts along with the
information in the request and computes the new set of facts.
*** ---facts state-update function---
*** next Facts equations over the requests
op nextF : Facts Action Subject -> Facts .
vars I I1 : Individual .
** ---PROGRAM---
eq nextF(F, wtr(I), I1 ) = F paid(I) regd(I) .
eq nextF(F, wtp(I), I1 ) = F paid(I) .
eq nextF(F, bnc(I), I1 ) = F bncd(I) .
.
.
.
Figure 14: Program Module
5.3 The Policy
The Policy module contains constructs for the policy’s decisions and set of
rules defining what actions are allowed according to the facts in the environment.
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*** generic decision constructs
ops permit deny : -> Decision .
Figure 15: Decisions
The goal of the policy is to ensure that all requests are accounted for, i. e.,
there is a decision for each request. Since the resulting decision does not depend
exclusively on the request but on the current facts we define a function that returns
decision derived from the normalization process issued from a request term and
from the information contained in the environments.
Definition 28 (Authorization Function). Let the policy P be a set of authoriza-
tion rules A where each request is defined using equational theory axioms. We
define the binary function auth as
auth : Facts × Action × Subject → Decision
An authorization rule is a conditional equation where the left side is a term
of the form auth(F, Act, Subj) with F ⊆ Facts, Act ∈ Action and Subj ∈
Subject. The equation is reduced to a d ∈ Decision if a condition is true about
the environment, i. e., if the set of facts satisfies a policy relevant predicate.
op auth : Facts Action Subject -> Decision .
***pr 1 : I is permitted to register if I paid
eq auth(F, wtr(I), I) = if F has paid(I) and not F has bncd(I) and
not F has regd(I)
then permit
else deny fi .
***pr 2 : I is permitted to pay if I did not pay already
.
.
.
Figure 16: Policy: set of authorization rules A
The goal is to to have the policy static and on top of the system – this way
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we can freely make changes to A without altering the program, which may exist
without the policy.
5.4 The System
In the program LTS, transition from an environment state F to environment
state F
′
depends on the information contained in either a system action (pg. 11)
or a subject action (pg. 11). We differentiate between two implementation of
the system – a weak and a strong one. We consider a weak implementation one
where the program checks the policy as a guard on actions whereas a strong
implementation suggests that the program is not aware of a guarding mechanism
(see our model on pg. 18) but it is the system that enforces the use of the reference
monitor.
Definition 29 (Node Function). Let the system T be a set of conditional rewrite
rules TRS where node transition of T corresponds to a permitted request from a
subject to execute an action over a resource considering the current set of environ-
ment facts. We define the function node as
node : Facts × Action × Subject → Node
An important note must be made here about the fact that we have to encode
the system’s transition labels, i. e., the action inside of the system nodes .
A transition is a defined as a conditional rule where the left-hand side is a
term of the form node(F, Act, Subj) with F ⊆ Facts, Act ∈ Action and Subj ∈
Subject, and the right-hand side is a term of the form
node(nextF (F, Act, Subj), Act
′
, Subj
′
)
where Act
′
∈ Action and Subj
′
∈ Subject are a new action and a subject allocated
respectively by the system.
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As defined above, the nextF function will compute the new set of facts de-
pending on the information from the request. The conditional part of the rule
refers to the authorization mechanism – the transition will be allowed if the the
auth function returns a permit decision for the next node in the system.
Naturally, we would like to restrict the system to be composed of only good
nodes. That is, if N is the set of all possible states, the set GA ⊆ N is the set of
good nodes as specified by the policy A. A node g ∈ N is considered good if the
authorization mechanism allows the transition from an initial state to g based on
the request and the facts.
Definition 30 (Good Node). We define a node of the form node(F, Act, Subj)
good if
auth(node(F, Act, Subj)) = permit
.
In order to restrict the system so that it is composed only of good nodes we
have to consider the next state, i. e., starting form an initial node n0 ∈ G
A, the
only allowed transitions ni ⇁ ni+1 are those that produce good nodes.
Initially, our model of the system included a denied node, which served as an
error node for transitions for which the auth function returned a deny decision.
We realized that this implementation caused the generation of unwanted, or rather
trivial counterexamples when we used the Model Checker to verify properties.
We implement the system as a Maude system module, which inherits the sig-
natures of the policy and the program.
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op node : Facts Action Subject -> Node .
op denied : -> Node .
*** rule for "wants to pay" request
crl node(F, wtp(I), I) => node(nextF(F,wtp(I), I), R1, I) if
auth(nextF(F,wtp(I), I), R1, I) = permit /\ (R1 restRequest) :=
(wtr(I) bnc(I)) .
.
.
.
Figure 17: System Module
5.5 The Logic
Exploration of all the possible rewrites from a given state is accomplished
trough the Model Checker module provided with Core Maude. To be able to
check the policy for certain properties we need to associate the Kripke structure
above to rewrite theory. This is accomplished with the Kripke module, in which
we make explicit the Boolean state predicates and define the ks-states as a superset
of our configuration.
Definition 31 (Model Checking). We define a new module, which extends the
predefined policy, program and system modules along with the MODEL-CHECKER
module, and contains
• the sort Node defined as a subsort of State (predifined sort inherited from
the SATISFACTION module),
• relevant state predicates as operators of sort Prop, and
• set of equations specifying for what states a predicate evaluates to True.
These propositions are specific to the and are need for stating the desired safety
(something bad never happens, G¬ϕ), liveness (something good keeps happening,
G(ϕ→ Fϕ)) or any other properties.
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subsorts Node < State .
ops ispaid isregd isbncd : Individual -> Prop .
op P : -> Prop .
var F : Facts .
var Act : Action .
var Subj : Subject .
var I : Individual .
*** equations defining when each of the state prediactes holds in
a given state
ceq node(F,Act, Subj) |= ispaid(I) = true if F has paid(I) .
ceq node(F,Act, Subj)|= isregd(I) = true if F has regd(I) .
ceq node(F,Act, Subj) |= isbncd(I) = true if F has bncd(I) .
ceq node(F,Act, Subj) |= P = false [owise] .
...
Figure 18: Model Checking Module
5.6 Analysis using Maude Tools
The Model Checker module’s operator modelCheck takes a ks-state and a LTL
formula α and return either a Boolean True if α is satisfied or counterexample
when it is not. The counterexample is a pair of a state and a rule label applied at
each state. Examples of specifying reductions corresponding to policy properties
are listed below.
op a : -> Individual [ctor] .
*** property 1: if a has registered implies that a has paid
red modelCheck(node(nil,wtp(a), a), [] (isregd(a) -> ispaid(a)) )
.
*** property 2: if a has paid but the check has bounced a cannot
register
red modelCheck(node(paid(a) bncd(a),wtr(a), a), [] ~ isregd(a) )
.
.
.
Figure 19: Reductions of modelCheck
6 Datalog Policies to Maude Specifications
In this section we give an approach for transcribing policies captured as Datalog
programs into Maude modules.
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6.1 Definitions
We have adopted the following Datalog terms and definitions [11].
(atom) An atom is a string of letters, digits, underscores; an atom string starts
with a lowercase letter.
(variable) A variable is a string of letters, digits, underscores; a variable string
starts with a capital letter.
(identifier) An identifier is a string omitting special characters; an identifier
strings does not start with a capital letter.
(term) A term is a variable or constant or underscore.
(literal) A literal is a predicate symbol followed by optional parenthesized list of
comma-separated terms.
(predicate symbol) A predicate symbolor a relation is a string or identifier
(facts) A fact is a true assertion about a part of the environment
(rule) A rule is a sentence allowing for a fact or facts deduction from given facts
(goal) A goal is a literal preceded by the symbol “?–” used for formulating queries
To avoid symbol confusion when we talk about facts and rules, we use R and
F to denote Datalog rules and facts respectively as apposed to R and F in the
rewriting paradigm.
Both facts and rules are represented as clauses of the form
R0(~u0) : −R1(~u1), . . . , Rn(~un)
where Ri are predicates, ~ui are tuples of variables and constants. The left-hand
side of the rule is called a head, the right-hand side is considered the rule’s body. If
a clause has empty body then it is considered a fact, and a rule if it contains at least
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one predicate. For a set of rules R, edb(R) denotes extensional predicates, i. e.,
ones occurring only in the body, and idb(R) denotes intentional predicates, i. e.,
ones occurring in the head. A Datalog policy’s signature ΣR is edb(R) ∪ idb(R).
The set F of AP s over ΣR is defined as a set of facts. For the policies considered
in this paper, rules are non-recursive, meaning that no idb predicate (permit or
deny) occurs in the right-hand side of any rule.
A non-recursive Datalog rule is essentially a conjunctive query [1] over the set
of edb facts. A set of such rules, then, constitutes a definition of the idb predicates
in terms of the edb facts as follows. If Q is an idb predicate and a1, ...an are
constants, then Q(a1, ...an) is defined to hold if and only if there is a rule
Q(~u) : −R1(u1), . . . , Rn(un)
and a substitution σ mapping ~u to ~a, such that for each i, Ri(σ(u1)) is an edb fact.
6.2 Policy Example
A given a Datalog policy R includes the predicates permit and deny – called
decisions – of the form decision(Subject, Action, Object), where Subject, Action
and Object are sorts. In this setting, a rule over ΣR has a head either permit or
deny. The policy R will be then a set of rules over ΣR as in the example below of
a students policy for reading/grading homeworks:
1. permit(X , readHW, Y ) :– student(X), hw(Y ), author(X,Y )
2. deny(X , gradeHW, Y ) :– student(X), hw(Y )
3. permit(X , gradeHW, Y ) :– faculty(X), hw(Y )
Figure 20: Datalog Policy R
For R1 and a given set of Datalog facts F1 we can determine the truth value
of the edb(R1). For example if F1= {student(John), student(Ana), hw(1), hw(2),
author(John, 1), author(Ana, 2)} following (1) we add to F1 the computed facts,
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idb(R1), from R1, which are permit(John, readHW, 1), permit(Ana, readHW, 2),
etc.
6.3 Datalog Policy to Term Rewriting Policy
Given a Datalog policy R there exists a policy R where the body of a R rule is
the left-hand side of the corresponding R rule, and the head of R is the right-hand
side of R. The relational symbol “:–” is replaced with “−→” and the conjunction
operator “ ,” is replaced with the associative and commutative operator “∧” as in
the example below:
R = permit(X , readHW, Y ) :– student(X), hw(Y ), author(X,Y )
R = student(X) ∧ hw(Y ) ∧ author(X,Y ) −→ permit(X , readHW, Y )
where the left-hand side of the rewriting policy rule is the set of environment facts.
In this direct transformation, the terms F1 on the left-hand side will not be
added to the list of F . One approach is to add them to the right-hand site with
the conjunction operator:
student(X) ∧ hw(Y ) ∧ author(X,Y ) −→ permit(X , readHW, Y ) ∧ F1.
This direct transformation of Datalog rules to rewrite rules might not be suit-
able for implementing a policy as Maude module. Even more so, if we would like
to separate the program (the transition system of environment facts) from the
policy using the above direct transformation will be inadequate.
6.4 Maude Policy Module
To model R as a Maude specification module we need to define the required
sorts and constructs beforehand (see section 6). The implementation of the small
policy example above depends on the program specifications (definitions of relevant
sorts and ops) but since we are concerned here only with the set of policy rules
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we will partially ignore that fact. Recall, that we have defined F as a multiset
of facts (pg. 16) relevant to the policy domain and the auth function (pg. 26) as
the decision computing mechanism. Then, in general, the transformation from R
to R as a Maude specification becomes as trivial as translating the set of Datalog
policy rules to a set of conditional equations.
Definition 32 (Datalog to Maude). Given a policy rule r ∈ R, a decision d of
the form d(Subject, Action ,Object), and a set of facts F1 ⊆ F with
r = d :– F1
then the corresponding rewriting rule in Maude is of the form
auth(F , Action, Subject) = d
For instance, the following Datalog rule from the policy above
R= permit(X , readHW, Y ) :– student(X), hw(Y ), author(X,Y )
will become either the following policy rule as an equation in Maude
eq auth(student(X) hw(Y ) author(X,Y ) , readHW, hw(Y)) = permit
or – depending on the complexity of the predicates – the following conditional
equation:
ceq auth(F, readHW, hw(Y)) = permit if F has student(X) hw(Y ) author(X,Y ) .
7 Conclusions
We presented a process of formalizing security policies that are integral part of
access control systems using term rewriting techniques. The implementation of the
policy, the program and the system as distinct Maude modules was consistent with
our conceptual model of the separation between policy and program. In view of
34
7 CONCLUSIONS
the fact that security policies could written as Datalog programs we provide steps
to translate Datalog policy rules as sets of equational theory axioms contained in
a functional Maude module. We further explored the flexibility of our approach
to formalize and reason about Turnin.
7.1 Analysis of Turnin
One of the questions we can ask about a security policy is whether the policy is
consistent, i. e., is it impossible to compute different decisions for the same access
control request. Because we have implemented the policy as a Maude functional
module consisting of equational theory axioms, Maude enforces the corresponding
set of rules to be confluent hence consistent (pg. 16).
The modular implementation of the concept allows us to reason about the
policy independent of the program – we can make changes to the policy without
modifying the program and vice versa. The structure provides for adequate policy
or program modification if a certain desired security property is proved false.
Using the Model Checker we can verify properties written as LTL formulas.
Below we list several general statements in English one can ask about Turnin
and their corresponding modelCheck reduction statement. We reason about the
system starting after a predefined good initial state. The properties below hold
true for all paths.
Property A: If a student s can read a submitted by student t file, then s and t
are partners
Since the LTL operators next © and henceforth  commute we can translate the
above sentence into
1. © ( wbPer(view(f(1)), u(1)) −→ isSubmitted(c(1), a(1), f(1),u(2), Sh,Bl)
∧ isPartners(c(1), a(1), u(1), u(2))) ).
Property B: If a student s can read a submitted file f, then either s is the owner
of f or s is viewing f submitted by their partner
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1. © ( wbPer(view(f(1)), u(1)) −→ isSubmitted(c(1),a(1),f(1),u(2),Sh,Bl) ∧
isPartners(c(1),a(1),u(1),u(2)) ∨ isSubmitted(c(1), a(1), f(1),u(1),Sh,Bl)) ).
Property C: Every user has at most one role per course
1. © ( isUserRole(c(Cn), u(Un), Rl) /\ isUserRole(c(Cn), u(Un), Rl1) −→
isRoleEq(Rl, Rl1)) ) .
The analysis of the above properties can be taken further to include significant
changes in the policy axioms and observation of how that affects the outcome of
the model checking reduction. For example, questions such as does a modification
to make a property hold lead to making a previously desired property not hold,
can be further explored. Another important feature that our model provides is
that we can also change the program and reason about the effects of those changes
7.2 Problems & Concerns
The majority of the problems of modeling Turnin appeared to be concentrated
only in one area of our modular implementation - the system. Formalizing the
policy as a axioms defining the auth function was not problematic, and neither
was modeling the program’s facts transition system but the simulation of random
actions within the system posed as a challenge. Furthermore, due to the complexity
of the domain relevant predicates and the restriction of variable rule position,
we were forced to apply clumsy techniques to simulate nondeterministic, pseudo-
random actions in the system.
The latter could be a likely reason for the several segmentation fault errors that
caused termination of model checking reductions. It will be interesting to explore
further the reasons for that and whether it was due to checking for specific types
of LTL formulas or due to inappropriate definition of proposition satisfiability
equations.
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7.3 Future Work
Even though this work presents a model for formalization and verification
of rewriting-based security polices and further provides an implementation in
Maude’s environment, there are still many avenues for future work. We believe
that conceptually the foundation is solid but we have not explored various en-
coding schemes. Although we present a general way to implement policies using
Maude specifications it might not be applicable to large complex systems due to
the fact that we are simulating interactions between subjects and objects rather
than simply reasoning about the policy as a stand-alone entity.
• The current system can be improved to better simulate nondeterministic
actions. A possible way of addressing the issue is exploring the use of Object
Oriented modules in Maude or Real Time Maude. It might be possible that
the new environment will facilitate the simulation of system with random
transitions in an agile way.
• The attempt to reason about the “correctness” of Turnin, that is, verifying
properties using the Model Checker could be more successful if we introduce
more specific propositions and define carefully the satisfiability axioms for
them. Furthermore, specific properties can be readily analyzed after changes
to the policy or the program.
37
REFERENCES
References
[1] S. Abiteboul, R. Hull, and V. Vianu. Foundations of Databases. Reading,
MA, 1995.
[2] Franz Baader and Tobias Nipkow. Term Rewriting and All That. Cambridge
University Press, August 1999.
[3] Steve Barker and Maribel Fernández. Term rewriting for access control. In
DBSec, pages 179–193, 2006.
[4] Moritz Y. Becker and Peter Sewell. Cassandra: Flexible trust management,
applied to electronic health records.
[5] E. D. Bell and L. J. LaPadula. In Secure computer systems: Mathemati-
cal foundations. Technical Report Mitre Report ESD-TR-73-278 (Vol. I-III).
Mitre Corporation, 1974.
[6] M. Bishop. Introduction to Computer Security. Addison-Wesley Professional,
2004.
[7] A. Bouhoula and J. Meseguer. Specification and Proof in Membership Equa-
tional Logic. Tapsoft’97: Theory and Practice of Software Development:
7th International Joint Conference CAAP/FASE, Lille, France, April 14-18,
1997: Proceedings, 1997.
[8] Edmund M. Clarke. Model checking. Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
1346:54–??, 1997.
[9] M. Clavel, F. Durán, S. Eker, P. Lincoln, N. Martı-Oliet, J. Meseguer, and
C. Talcott. Maude manual (version 2.3). January 2007.
[10] Manuel Clavel, Francisco Durán, Steven Eker, Patrick Lincoln, Narciso Martí-
Oliet, José Meseguer, and José F. Quesada. Maude: Specification and pro-
gramming in rewriting logic. Theoretical Computer Science, 2001.
[11] The MITRE Corporation. Datalog user manual, 2004.
[12] F. Cuppens, N. Cuppens-Boulahia, and T. Sans. Nomad: a security model
with non atomic actions and deadlines. Computer Security Foundations, 2005.
CSFW-18 2005. 18th IEEE Workshop, pages 186–196, 2005.
[13] Anderson Santana de Oliveira. Rewriting-based access control policies. Electr.
Notes Theor. Comput. Sci., 171(4):59–72, 2007.
[14] John DeTreville. Binder, a logic-based security language. In SP ’02: Pro-
ceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, page 105,
Washington, DC, USA, 2002. IEEE Computer Society.
38
REFERENCES
[15] S. di Vimercati, P. Samarati, and S. Jajodia. Policies, models, and languages
for access control, 2005.
[16] Daniel J. Dougherty, Kathi Fisler, and Shriram Krishnamurthi. Specifying
and reasoning about dynamic access-control policies. In IJCAR, pages 632–
646, 2006.
[17] Kathi Fisler. Turnin - assignment submission application: Specification doc-
ument, November 2005.
[18] Kathi Fisler, Shriram Krishnamurthi, Leo A. Meyerovich, and Michael Carl
Tschantz. Verification and change-impact analysis of access-control policies.
In ICSE ’05: Proceedings of the 27th international conference on Software
engineering, pages 196–205, New York, NY, USA, 2005. ACM Press.
[19] J. Goguen and J. Meseguer. Order-sorted algebra I: equational deduction for
multiple inheritance, overloading, overloading, exeptions and partial opera-
tions. Theoretical Computer Science, 105:217–273, 1992.
[20] J.A. Goguen and G. Malcolm. Software Engineering with Obj: Algebraic
Specification in Action. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000.
[21] JY Halpern and V. Weissman. Using first-order logic to reason about policies.
Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2003. Proceedings. 16th IEEE,
pages 187–201.
[22] Michael A. Harrison, Walter L. Ruzzo, and Jeffrey D. Ullman. Protection in
operating systems. Commun. ACM, 19(8):461–471, 1976.
[23] C. Kirchner and H. Kirchner. Rewriting, solving, proving. A preliminary
version of a book available at www. loria. fr/ckirchne/rsp. ps. gz, 1999.
[24] Butler W. Lampson. Protection. SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev., 8(1):18–24, 1974.
[25] Theodore McCombs. Maude 2.0 primer version 1.0, 2003.
[26] T. Moses. extensible access control markup language (xacml) version 1.0.,
February 2003.
[27] Gunter Karjoth Calvin Powers Matthias Schunter Paul Ashley, Satoshi Hada.
Enterprise privacy authorization language (epal), March 2003.
39
A Turnin Specification [17]
Version 3, November 1 2005
Core Domains
- User(Pwd:Password) : u, u1, u2 ... - File: f, f1, ...
- Role={student, ta, faculty, admin}: r, r1, ...
- Assignment(Status: AsgmtStatus, Partners:Set[Set[User]], Submitted:File x
User x SharingMode x Late Comments:User/Partnering x CommentFile) : a
- Courses(Members:set[User], Asgmts:set[Assignment], UserRoles:Members
x Role): c, c1, ...
Minor Domains
- Password
- SharingMode={self, group}
- Late={true, false}
- AsgmtStatus={new, open, closed, late, deleted}: s, s1, ...
System Actions
- Change (add/remove) users: add-user(u,c,r), rem-user(u,c)
- Create assignment: create-asgmt(c)
- Change assignment status: change-status(a,c,new-status)
- Submit file: submit(u,c,a,f,mode)
- Download/View file: view(f)
- Change password: change-pwd(u,new-pwd)
- Change (add/remove) partners: make-partners(u1,u2,a), unpartner(u,a)
- Upload grading comment: upload-comments(u,c,a,cf)
Functions
- RIC(user, role, course) == (user,role) in course.UserRoles
- Partners(u,u1,a) == Exists grp: set[User] | g in a.Partners & u in g &
u1 in g - cell(u,a) = {u1 | Partners(u,u1,a)}
- new-assign() returns new assignment not already in some course
Access policies
- Change (add/remove) user
<u1, add-user(u,c,r)> if RIC(u1,faculty,c) + RIC(u1,admin,c) <u1,
rem-user(u,c)> if RIC(u1,faculty,c) & u in c.student+ta + RIC(u1,admin,c)
- Create assignment
<u1, create-asgmt(c)> if RIC(u1,faculty,c)
- Change assignment status
<u1, change-status(a,c,new-status)> if a in c.Asgmts & (RIC(u1,faculty,c) +
RIC(u1,ta,c))
- Submit file [u and u1 allows policy where staff can submit for a student]
<u1, submit(u,c,a,_,_)> if u=u1 & RIC(u1,student,c) & a.Status = open
- Download/View files [Implementation may enforce instantiation of c & a]
<u1, view(f)> if Exists c in Courses, a in c.Asgmts | Exists (f,u1,_,_) in
a.Submitted + Exists (f,u,group,_)
in a.Submitted & Partners(u,u1,a) + Exists (f,_,_,_)
in a.Submitted & (RIC(u1,faculty,c) + RIC(u1,ta,c)) + Exists (u1,f)
in a.Comments + Exists (_,f)
in a.Comments & (RIC(u1,faculty,c) + RIC(u1,ta,c))
- Change password
<u1, change-pwd(u,new-pwd)> if u1=u + Exists c in Courses | u
in c.Members & RIC(u1,admin,c) + RIC(u1,faculty,c) & (RIC(u,student,c) +
RIC(u,ta,c)) + RIC(u1,ta,c) & RIC(u,student,c)
- Change partners
<u1, make-partners(u,u2,a)> if Exists c in Courses | a in c.Asgmts & RIC(u1,faculty,c)
+ RIC(u1,ta,c)
<u1, unpartner(u,a)> if Exists c in Courses | a in c.Asgmts & RIC(u1,faculty,c)
+ RIC(u1,ta,c)
- Upload grading comment
<u1, upload-comments(u,c,a,cf)> if RIC(u1,ta,c) + RIC(u1,faculty,c)
State-update policies
- Change (add/remove) users
add-user(u,c,r) ==> Users’ = Users U {u} [assumes u not already in system,
U handles if not]
c.Members’ = c.Members U {u} c.UserRoles’ = c.UserRoles U {(u,r)}
rem-user (u,c) ==> [does not remove user from user domain, just from course]
c.Members’ = c.Members - {u} c.UserRoles’ = c.UserRoles - {(u, _)}
- Create assignment
create-asgmt(c) ==> c.Asgmts’ = c.Asgmts U {new-assign()}
- Change assignment status
change-status (a,c,newstat) ==> a.Status’ = newstat
- Submit file
submit (u,c,a,f,mode) ==> if a.Status=late c.a.Submitted’ = c.a.Submitted
U {(f,u,mode,true)}
else c.a.Submitted’ = c.a.Submitted U {(f,u,mode,false)}
- Download/View files [NONE]
- Change password
change-pwd (u,new-pwd) ==> Users’ = Users - {(u,_)} U {(u,new-pwd)}
- Change partners
make-partners(u,u2,a) ==> a.Partners’ = a.Partners - cell(u,a) - cell(u2,a) U
{(cell(u,a) U cell(u2,a))}
unpartner(u,a) ==> a.Partners’ = a.Partners - {cell(u,a)} U {(u)} U
{cell(u,a) - {u}}
- Upload grading comment — this doesn’t handle replace
upload-comments(u,c,a,cf) ==> a.Comments’ = a.Comments U {(u,cf)}
Mode Transition Information (and how that affects policies)
default policy contains rules for changing users, creating assignments,
changing assignment status,
change password (things that don’t take assignment as an argument)
[this suggests that policy must have different rules per actual assignment,
rather than the abstract class of assignments]
Transition System over AsgmtStatus
init new
new : enables make-partners, unpartner -> open, deleted
open : enables submit, download/view -> late, deleted
late : [makes submissions late, no effect on access] -> open, closed, deleted
closed: disables submit,make-partners,unpartner enables upload-comments ->
deleted, late, open
deleted : disables submit, download/view, make-partners, unpartner
[currently no support for restoration]
Invariants
- If status is open or late, all users/groups in c have writeable dir to submit to
- Every user has at most one role per course
- Partners sets in assignments partition student course members
- No faculty/staff/admin is in homework group for an assignment
- Open assignments have no submissions marked late
- Submission not allowed for asgnt/usr for which a grading comment exists
Non-invariants
- File need not be unique to asgmts (same file may be submitted to multiple
asgmts)
B Turnin Maude Implementation
Signatures Module
fmod SIGNATURES i s
∗∗∗ s o r t s
inc SET{Nat} .
s o r t s Subject Object Action SysAction SubjAction Fact Facts
Dec i s ion Node .
subso r t SysAction SubjAction < Action .
subso r t User < Subject .
subso r t Fact < Facts .
s o r t s User F i l e Role Assignment Asgmt AsgmtStatus Status
Partners Submitted SharingMode Course Members UserRole
Late .
subso r t AsgmtStatus < Status .
subso r t Late < Bool .
∗∗∗ some o f t h i s i s reduntant ( can merge i s S t a tu s+isAsgmt )
op i s S t a tu s : Course Assignment AsgmtStatus −> Status .
op i sPa r tn e r s : Course Assignment User User −> Partners .
op isSubmitted : Course Assignment F i l e User SharingMode
Bool −> Submitted .
op isMember : Course User −> Members . −−− maybe i sUserRole
cove r s isMember
op isAsgmt : Course Assignment −> Asgmt .
op i sUserRole : Course User Role −> UserRole .
ops s e l f group : −> SharingMode [ c to r ] . −−− Sharing Mode
ops new open c l o s ed l a t e de l e t ed : −> AsgmtStatus [ c to r ] .
−−− Assignment Status
∗∗∗ mul t i s e t o f p r ed i c a t e s / g ene r i c
op n i l : −> Facts [ c to r ] .
op __ : Facts Facts −> Facts [ a s s oc comm id : n i l ] .
∗∗∗ pr ed i c a t e s / s p e c i f i c
subso r t Status Partners Members Submitted Asgmt UserRole
Course < Fact .
∗∗∗ pr ed i c a t e s a t i s f i a b i l i t y ( i f p r ed i c a t e i s an element o f
a Facts then p r ed i c a t e i s t rue )
op _has_ : Facts Fact −> Bool .
vars F : Facts .
var P : Fact .
eq F P has P = true .
eq F has P = f a l s e [ owise ] .
∗∗∗ s ub j e c t s in the environment / s p e c i f i c
op u : Nat −> User .
op c : Nat −> Course .
∗∗∗ ob j e c t s in the environment / s p e c i f i c
op f : Nat −> F i l e .
op a : Nat −> Assignment .
∗∗∗ r o l e s in the environment / s p e c i f i c
ops student ta f ac admin : −> Role [ c to r ] .
∗∗∗ SysActions are a c t i on s a s s o c i a t ed to admin or f a c u l t y
in some cas e s to ta but not to s tudents
op addUser : Course User Role −> SysAction .
op rmvUser : Course User Role −> SysAction .
op createAsgmt : Course Assignment −> SysAction . ∗∗∗
op changeStatus : Course Assignment AsgmtStatus −>
SysAction .
op makePartners : Course Assignment User User −> SysAction
.
op unPartners : Course Assignment User User −> SysAction .
∗∗∗ SubjActions are a c t i on s that are i n i t i a t e d by students
op submitFi l e : Course Assignment F i l e SharingMode −>
SubjAction .
op view : F i l e −> SubjAction .
endfm
Program Module
fmod PROGRAM i s
pr SIGNATURES .
var St St1 : Status .
var B : Bool .
var Sh : SharingMode .
var Rl : Role .
var F : Facts .
var P : Fact .
−−− natura l numbers f o r us e r s cour s e s f i l e s ass ignments
vars Un Un1 Un2 Cn Cn1 Fn An An1 : Nat .
∗∗∗ cour s e s domain
op cour s e s : −> Facts .
eq cour s e s = c (1 ) c (2 ) .
∗∗∗ −−−STATE−UPDATE−−− PROGRAM MODULES
∗∗∗ next Facts equat ions over the r eque s t s
op nextF : Facts Action Subject −> Facts .
eq P P = P . −−− no f a c t redundancy
−−−add user to a course
eq nextF (F , addUser ( c (Cn) , u (Un) , Rl ) , u (Un1) ) = F
isUserRole ( c (Cn) , u (Un) , Rl ) .
−−−rmv user
eq nextF (F isUserRole ( c (Cn) , u (Un) , Rl ) , rmvUser ( c (Cn) , u (
Un) , Rl ) , u (Un1) ) = F .
−−−c r e a t e asgmt
eq nextF (F , createAsgmt ( c (Cn) , a (An) ) , u (Un) ) = F isAsgmt ( c
(Cn) , a (An) ) i s S t a tu s ( c (Cn) , a (An) , new) . −−− now i f we
combine the s e t ab l e s do we l oo s e anything ??? as in
isAsgnmt ( c , a , s t a tu s )
−−−change s t a tu s
eq nextF (F i s S t a tu s ( c (Cn) , a (An) , St ) , changeStatus ( c (Cn) , a
(An1) , St1 ) , u (Un) ) = F i s S t a tu s ( c (Cn) , a (An) , St1 ) .
−−−submit f i l e
eq nextF (F , submitFi l e ( c (Cn) , a (An) , f (Fn) , Sh) , u (Un) ) =
i f F has i s S t a tu s ( c (Cn) , a (An) , l a t e )
then F isSubmitted ( c (Cn) , a (An) , f (Fn) ,u (Un) , Sh , t rue )
e l s e F isSubmitted ( c (Cn) , a (An) , f (Fn) ,u (Un) , Sh , f a l s e ) f i
.
−−−view f i l e no change
eq nextF (F , view ( f (Fn) ) , u (Un) ) = F .
−−−make par tne r s
eq nextF (F , makePartners ( c (Cn) , a (An) , u (Un) , u (Un1) ) , u (
Un2) ) = F i sPa r tn e r s ( c (Cn) , a (An) , u (Un) , u (Un1) ) .
eq i sPa r tn e r s ( c (Cn) , a (An) , u(Un) , u (Un1) ) i sPa r tn e r s ( c (Cn)
, a (An) , u (Un1) , u (Un) ) = i sPa r tn e r s ( c (Cn) , a (An) , u (Un)
, u (Un1) ) .
endfm
Policy Module
fmod POLICY i s
p r o t e c t i n g SIGNATURES .
var s St : Status .
var s B : Bool .
var s Sh : SharingMode .
var s Rl Rl1 : Role .
var s F : Facts .
var Act : Action .
−−− na tura l numbers f o r us e r s cour s e s f i l e s ass ignments
var s Un Un1 Un2 Cn Cn1 Cn2 Fn An An1 : Nat .
−−− admin i s p r e s ent in a l l c our s e s and i s u (0 )
eq F has i sUserRo le ( c (Cn) ,u (0 ) , admin) = true .
∗∗∗ −−−POLICY−−−
ops permit deny : −> Dec i s i on .
op auth : Facts Action User −> Dec i s i on .
∗∗∗ ACCESS RULES
−−−add/rmv use r s from cour s e s AR1: only f a cu l t y in course c or
the admin can add use r s to c −−−EVERY USER HAS AT MOST ONE
ROLE PER COURSE
ceq auth (F, addUser ( c (Cn) , u (Un) , Rl ) , u (Un1) ) = permit i f F
has c (Cn) and
not F has i sUserRo le ( c (Cn) ,u (Un) , ta ) and
not F has i sUserRo le ( c (Cn) ,u (Un) , s tudent ) and
not F has i sUserRo le ( c (Cn) ,u (Un) , f a c ) and
(F has i sUserRo le ( c (Cn) ,u (Un1) , f a c ) or F has i sUserRo le ( c (Cn) ,u (
Un1) , admin ) )
and not Rl == admin .
eq auth (F, addUser ( c (Cn) , u(Un) , Rl ) , u (Un1) ) = deny [ owise ] .
∗∗∗ can the admin remove h ims e l f from the course with r o l e admin?
no
ceq auth (F , rmvUser ( c (Cn) , u (Un) , Rl ) , u (Un1) ) = permit i f F
has c (Cn) and F has i sUserRo le ( c (Cn) ,u (Un) , Rl ) and F has
i sUserRo le ( c (Cn) ,u (Un1) , admin ) and not Rl == admin .
ceq auth (F , rmvUser ( c (Cn) , u (Un) , Rl ) , u (Un1) ) = permit i f F
has c (Cn) and F has i sUserRo le ( c (Cn) ,u (Un) , Rl ) and F has
i sUserRo le ( c (Cn) ,u (Un1) , f a c ) and not Rl == admin and not Rl
== fac .
eq auth (F, rmvUser ( c (Cn) , u(Un) , Rl ) , u (Un1) ) = deny [ owise ] .
−−−c r e a t e asgmt f o r a course AR2: only f a cu l t y in c can c r e a t e
assgmnts in c ( when you c r e a t e an ass ignment a f a c t i s added
wtih s t a tu s new
eq auth (F, createAsgmt ( c (Cn) , a (An) ) , u (Un) ) = i f F has c (Cn)
and not F has isAsgmt ( c (Cn) , a (An) ) and F has i sUserRo le ( c (Cn
) ,u (Un) , f a c )
then permit
e l s e deny f i .
−−−change s t a tu s f o r an ass ignment AR3: fa c and students in c
can change a i f a i s in c ( i f we look at the one below th i s
becomes
∗∗∗ eq auth (F isAsgmt ( c (Cn) , a (An1) , St ) , changeStatus ( c (Cn) , a (
An1) , St1 ) , u(Un) ) = i f (F has i sUserRo le ( c (Cn) ,u (Un . . . . .
eq auth (F, changeStatus ( c (Cn) , a (An1) , St ) , u (Un) ) = i f F has c
(Cn) and F has isAsgmt ( c (Cn) , a (An1) ) and (F has i sUserRo le ( c
(Cn) ,u(Un) , f a c ) or F has i sUserRo le ( c (Cn) ,u (Un) , ta ) )
then permit
e l s e deny f i .
−−−submit f i l e AR4: //note : s t a f f can submit f o r s tudents ? // we
can merge i s S t a tu s and isAsgmnt as in isAsgnmt ( c , a , s )
in s t ead o f isA ( c , a ) ( t h i s w i l l add a f a c t isSubmitted (Un . . )
eq auth (F, submitFi l e ( c (Cn) , a (An) , f (Fn) , Sh ) , u (Un) ) = i f F
has c (Cn) and F has isAsgmt ( c (Cn) , a (An) ) and F has
i sUserRo le ( c (Cn) ,u (Un) , s tudent ) and F has i s S t a tu s ( c (Cn) , a (
An) , open )
then permit
e l s e deny f i .
−−−view f i l e AR5: fa c and ta and owner or pa r tne r s can view f i l e
ceq auth (F c (Cn) isAsgmt ( c (Cn) , a (An) ) isSubmitted ( c (Cn) , a (An) ,
f (Fn) ,u (Un) ,Sh ,B) , view ( f (Fn) ) , u (Un1) ) = permit i f Un ==
Un1 . ∗∗∗owner can view f i l e
ceq auth (F c (Cn) isAsgmt ( c (Cn) , a (An) ) isSubmitted ( c (Cn) , a (An) ,
f (Fn) ,u (Un) ,Sh ,B) , view ( f (Fn) ) , u (Un1) ) = permit i f Sh ==
group and F has i sPa r tn e r s ( c (Cn) , a (An) , u(Un) , u (Un1) ) . ∗∗∗
partner can view f i l e
ceq auth (F c (Cn) isAsgmt ( c (Cn) , a (An) ) isSubmitted ( c (Cn) , a (An) ,
f (Fn) ,u (Un) ,Sh ,B) , view ( f (Fn) ) , u (Un1) ) = permit i f F has
i sUserRo le ( c (Cn) ,u (Un1) , f a c ) or F has i sUserRo le ( c (Cn) ,u(Un1
) , ta ) .
eq auth (F, view ( f (Fn) ) , u (Un1) ) = deny [ owise ] .
−−−pa r tne r s AR6: fa c or ta can make/ s p l i t pa r tne r s ( and other
ca s e s ?) ; ta / fa c cannot be pa r tne r s with students
eq auth (F, makePartners ( c (Cn) , a (An) , u (Un) , u (Un1) ) , u (Un2) ) =
i f F has c (Cn) and F has isAsgmt ( c (Cn) , a (An) )
and (F has i sUserRo le ( c (Cn) ,u (Un2) , f a c ) or F has i sUserRo le ( c (Cn
) ,u (Un2) , ta ) )
and F has i sUserRo le ( c (Cn) ,u (Un) , s tudent ) and F has i sUserRo le (
c (Cn) ,u(Un1) , s tudent )
and not F has i sUserRo le ( c (Cn) ,u(Un) , ta )
and not F has i sUserRo le ( c (Cn) ,u(Un1) , ta )
and not F has i sUserRo le ( c (Cn) ,u(Un) , f a c )
and not F has i sUserRo le ( c (Cn) ,u(Un1) , f a c )
then permit
e l s e deny f i .
eq auth (F, unPartners ( c (Cn) , a (An) , u(Un) , u (Un1) ) , u (Un2) ) = i f
F has c (Cn) and F has isAsgmt ( c (Cn) , a (An) )
and (F has i sUserRo le ( c (Cn) ,u (Un2) , f a c ) or F has i sUserRo le ( c (Cn
) ,u (Un2) , ta ) )
and F has i sUserRo le ( c (Cn) ,u (Un) , s tudent ) and F has i sUserRo le (
c (Cn) ,u(Un1) , s tudent )
and F has i sPa r tn e r s ( c (Cn) , a (An) , u(Un) , u (Un1) )
then permit
e l s e deny f i .
endfm
System Module
mod SYSTEM i s
pr PROGRAM .
pr POLICY .
var s St St1 : Status .
var B : Bool .
var Sh : SharingMode .
var s Rl Rl1 Rl2 Rl3 : Role .
var Act : Action .
var F : Facts .
−−− na tura l numbers f o r us e r s cour s e s f i l e s ass ignments a c t i o n s
var s Un Un1 Un2 Un3 Cn Cn1 Fn An An1 Ac Ac1 Ac2 : Nat .
var Rest Rest1 Rest2 RestUn RestUn1 RestAc : Set {Nat} .
op node : Facts Action Subject −> Node .
op __ : Role Role −> Role [ a s s o c comm] .
∗∗∗ −−−INITIAL STUFF−−−
−−− a "minimal" i n i t i a l s e t o f f a c t s and i n i t a i l ope ra t i on
op minimalFacts : −> Facts .
eq minimalFacts = cour s e s .
op noop : −> SysAction .
eq nextF (F, noop , u (77) ) = F .
eq auth (F, noop , u (77) ) = permit .
−−− so to model−check s t a r t i n g with minimal s t a t e use node (
minimalFacts , noop , u (77) )
−−− a " g ene r i c " i n i t i a l s e t o f f a c t s
op i n i t i a l F a c t s : −> Facts .
eq i n i t i a l F a c t s = minimalFacts i sUserRo le ( c (1 ) ,u (1 ) , s tudent )
i sUserRo le ( c (1 ) ,u (2 ) , s tudent ) i sUserRo le ( c (1 ) ,u (3 ) , ta )
i sUserRo le ( c (1 ) ,u (4 ) , f a c ) i sUserRo le ( c (2 ) ,u (1 ) , ta ) i sUserRo le ( c
(2 ) ,u (5 ) , s tudent ) isAsgmt ( c (1 ) , a (1 ) ) i s S t a tu s ( c (1 ) , a (1 ) ,
open )
i sPa r tn e r s ( c (1 ) , a (1 ) , u (1 ) , u (2 ) ) isSubmitted ( c (1 ) , a (1 ) , f ( 1 ) ,
u (1 ) , group , f a l s e ) .
∗∗∗ SYSTEM RULES ∗∗∗
−−− add user a c t i on
c r l [−−addUser−−] : node (F , Act , u (Un) ) => node ( nextF (F, Act , u (
Un) ) , addUser ( c (Cn) , u(Un1) , Rl ) , u (Un2) ) i f
(Un2 , RestUn) := (0 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ) /\
(Cn , Rest1 ) := (1 ,2 ) /\ (Un1 , Rest ) := (1 ,2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ) /\ (Rl Rl1
Rl2 ) := ( student ta fa c ) /\
auth ( nextF (F , Act , u (Un) ) , addUser ( c (Cn) , u (Un) , Rl ) , u (Un2) ) =
permit .
−−− remove user a c t i on
c r l [−−rmvUser−−] : node (F , Act , u (Un) ) => node ( nextF (F, Act , u (
Un) ) , rmvUser ( c (Cn) , u(Un1) , Rl ) , u (Un2) ) i f
(Un2 , RestUn) := (0 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ) /\
(Cn , Rest1 ) := (1 ,2 ) /\ (Un1 , Rest ) := (1 ,2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ) /\ (Rl Rl1
Rl3 ) := ( student ta fa c ) /\
auth ( nextF (F , Act , u (Un) ) , rmvUser ( c (Cn) , u (Un1) , Rl ) , u (Un2) ) =
permit .
−−− c r e a t e ass ignment ac t i on
c r l [−−createAsgmt−−] : node (F, Act , u (Un) ) => node ( nextF (F , Act
, u (Un) ) , createAsgmt ( c (Cn) , a (An) ) , u (Un2) ) i f
(Un2 , RestUn) := (0 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ) /\
(Cn , Rest1 ) := (1 ,2 ) /\ (An, Rest ) := (1 ,2 ) /\
auth ( nextF (F , Act , u (Un) ) , createAsgmt ( c (Cn) , a (An) ) , u (Un2) ) =
permit .
−−− change s t a tu s a c t i on
c r l [−−changeStatus −−] : node (F , Act , u (Un) ) => node ( nextF (F,
Act , u(Un) ) , changeStatus ( c (Cn) , a (An) , St1 ) , u(Un2) ) i f
(Un2 , RestUn) := (0 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ) /\
(Cn , Rest1 ) := (1 ,2 ) /\ (An, Rest ) := (1 ,2 ) /\ ( St St1 ) := (new
open c l o s ed l a t e de l e t ed ) /\
auth ( nextF (F , Act , u (Un) ) , changeStatus ( c (Cn) , a (An) , St1 ) , u (
Un2) ) = permit .
−−− make pa r tne r s a c t i on
c r l [−−makePartners−−] : node (F , Act , u (Un) ) => node ( nextF (F,
Act , u(Un) ) , makePartners ( c (Cn) , a (An) , u (Un3) , u (Un1) ) , u (
Un2) ) i f
(Un2 , RestUn) := (0 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ) /\
(Cn , Rest1 ) := (1 ,2 ) /\ (An, Rest ) := (1 ,2 ) /\ (Un3 , Un1 , Rest2 )
:= (1 ,2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ) /\
auth ( nextF (F , Act , u (Un) ) , makePartners ( c (Cn) , a (An) , u (Un3) , u (
Un1) ) , u (Un2) ) = permit .
−−− s epa ra te pa r tne r s a c t i on
c r l [−−unPartners−−] : node (F, Act , u(Un) ) => node ( nextF (F , Act ,
u(Un) ) , unPartners ( c (Cn) , a (An) , u (Un) , u(Un1) ) , u (Un2) ) i f
(Un2 , RestUn) := (0 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ) /\
(Cn , Rest1 ) := (1 ,2 ) /\ (An, Rest ) := (1 ,2 ) /\ (Un3 , Un1 , Rest2 )
:= (1 ,2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ) /\
auth ( nextF (F , Act , u (Un) ) , makePartners ( c (Cn) , a (An) , u (Un3) , u (
Un1) ) , u (Un2) ) = permit .
−−− view submitted f i l e a c t i on
c r l [−−v iewFi le−−] : node (F , Act , u (Un) ) => node ( nextF (F , Act , u
(Un) ) , view ( f (Fn) ) , u (Un2) ) i f
(Un2 , RestUn) := (0 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ) /\
(Fn , Rest1 ) := (1 ,2 ) /\
auth ( nextF (F , Act , u (Un) ) , view ( f (Fn) ) , u (Un2) ) = permit .
endm
Kripke Module
mod KRIPKE i s
pr SYSTEM .
∗∗∗ −−− MODEL CHECKER −−−
i n c MODEL−CHECKER .
∗∗∗ a s s o c i a t i n g system with KRS
subso r t Node < State .
subso r t Fact < Prop .
var Act Act1 : Action .
var F : Facts .
var Pr : Fact .
var s Un Un1 Cn : Nat .
var Sh : SharingMode .
var Bl : Bool .
var s Rl Rl1 : Role .
var Fn : F i l e .
ops wbPer : Action Subject −> Prop .
ops wbDen : Action Subject −> Prop .
op i sAct : Action Subject −> Prop .
eq node (F Pr , Act , u (Un) ) |= Pr = true .
eq node (F , Act , u (Un) ) |= Pr = f a l s e [ owise ] .
op isRoleEq : Role Role −> Prop .
eq node (F , Act , u (Un) ) |= isRoleEq ( student , s tudent ) = true .
−−−eq node (F , Act , u (Un) ) |= isRoleEq (R1 , R2) = true i f R1 ==
R2 .
ceq node (F , Act , u (Un) ) |= isAct (Act1 , u (Un1) ) = true i f Act ==
Act1 and Un == Un1 .
eq node (F , Act , u (Un) ) |= isAct (Act1 , u (Un1) ) = f a l s e [ owise ] .
ceq node (F, Act , u (Un) ) |= wbPer (Act1 , u (Un1) ) = true i f auth (
nextF (F , Act , u (Un) ) ,Act1 , u(Un1) ) = permit .
eq node (F, Act , u(Un) ) |= wbPer(Act1 , u (Un1) ) = f a l s e [ owise ] .
−−− THE MODEL CHECKER asks whether our proper ty i s True FOR ALL
PATHS. I f we want to f i nd A path where i t i s t rue we have to
negate the formula :
−−− Example : red modelCheck ( node ( c (1 ) , addUser ( c (1 ) , u (1 ) , ta ) ,
u (0 ) ) , <> isUserRo le ( c (1 ) ,u (1 ) , s tudent ) ) : the way we s e t up
the system the r e WILL be a s t a t e with
−−− i sUserRo le ( c (1 ) ,u (1 ) , s tudent ) eventua l l y so the
counterexample to the negat ion w i l l be our " e x i s t s " path
endm
Batch Module
*** loading of modules
in SIGNATURES .
in POLICY .
in PROGRAM .
in SYSTEM .
load model-checker .
in KRIPKE .
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